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On March 23, 2010, President Barack Obama signed
the "Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act"
(hereinafter "PPACA" or "the Act")' into law. Since
PPCA was enacted, a number of legal challenges have
been brought against the Federal Government alleging
that PPACA, and specifically the provision requiring
all citizens to purchase and maintain adequate health
insurance or else pay a penalty (hereinafter "individual
mandate"), 2 is unconstitutional. Five of these lawsuits
have already had preliminary decisions made as to
the courts' determinations of whether PPACA and the
individual mandate are constitutional. Ihe Richmond
Division ofthe Dstrict Court for the 1Eastern District of
Virginia deeided Virginia ex rel. Cuccinelli v Sebeliis
on August 2. 2010. Likewise, the Southern Division
of the Eastern District of Michigan decided Thonias
More Law Center v. Obana,4 on October 7. 2010. Just
one week later. the Pensacola Division of the Northern
District of Florida decided Florida ex rel. fcCollutm
i. C S Department of Health & Himan Services5 on
October 14, 2010.6 Most recently, the District Court
for the District of Columbia decided Wead v. Hoder
on February 22, 2011.
This paper argues that despite the arguments made by
the Plaintiffs in the various cases, PPACA, in its current
state, is constitutional. Part II of this paper examines
the background and rationale for PPACA and explores
the current interpretation of the Commerce Clause,
as determined by the U.S. Supreme Court. Part 111
of this paper examines some of the issues that have
been agreed by the Plaintiffs. Ihis paper will show
that individuals, businesses and states have standing
to pursue their claims against PPACA in the Federal
District Courts, and that the claims are ripe. This paper
will also argue that the penalty for non-compliance with
the individual mandate is not a tax. and therefore is not
controlled by the Anti-Injunction Act. Additionally.
although the type of activity authorized by PPACA

and the individual mandate has never been viewed
previously by the courts. the activity is economic
activity that is validly authorized under the Commerce
Clause of the United States Constitution. Part IV
concludes that in fturther litigation on these cases, and
in other challenges, courts should find PPACA and the
individual mandate constitutional.

PPCA was passed by both Houses of Congress
and signed into law by President Obama in March
of 2010. Congress passed PPACA in an attempt to
fix America's health care system. One of the major
goals of the Act is to reduce substantially the number
of uninsured Americans,iO people who cost taxpayers
billions of dollars per y ear in uncompensated care."
TFhe individual mandate is one way that Congress
sought to meet this end." Beginning in 2014, the
individual mandate requires that, unless a person fits
into a few narrow exceptionsI all Americans will be
required to purchase some form of health insurance or
be subject to a penalty. 4
In Perez v United States' the Supreme Court clarified
its interpretation of the Commerce Clause." Perez
explained that Congress's power to regulate under
the Commerce Clause is threefold: Congress can
regulate: "(1) the channels of interstate commerce;
(2) the instrumentalities of interstate commerce:
and (3) activities [substantially] affecting interstate
commerce."I The third prong is the focus of the current
constitutional debate over the individual mandate in
PPACA. Although Congress is generally authorized
to regulate commercial activities, an activity can only
be validly regulated under the Commerce Clause if
the Government can demonstrate that the activity
in question does in fact have a substantial effect on
interstate commerce.

A. The Plaintiffs Have Standing to Sue the
Government in the Federal Courts, and te
Claim s They Raise Are Ripe For Adjudieation
1.Standing
Accoiding to the United States Constitution, in
nrder for snmenne to hring a laiwsu it, thex must have

In Lulanv. Defenders oJ
a case or controvers.
WldliJe,2 the Supreme Court set forth three elements
necessary to establish standing: (1) the plaintiff must
have actually suffered an iijury: (2) there must be a
connection between the injury and the action they are
claiming caused the injury; and (3) it must be likely
that the court can remedy the wrong if they find for
the plaintiff.211In the PPACA cases, the Plaintiffs claim
they have standing because of both a present and a
future harm that they say will definitely come to them
due to both the individual mandate and the penalties
associated with it.22 The Government, however, claims
that the Plaintiffs do not have standing because no
injury has actually happened as of yet.23 In Whitnore
v. Arkansas,24 the Supreme Court determined that, in
order for a plaintiff to have a valid iijury in the present
when the actual iijury will happen in the future, the
"threatened injury must be certainly impending."
In Thomas lore Law Cente, Florida and ead, the
Plaintiffs claim that although the financial burden from
PPACA will not officially come until 2014, there is an
actual present harm because they are currently being
forced to begin rearranging their finances in preparation
for either having to buy health insurance or having to
pay a penalty in the future.> The Government, in all
three cases. claims that it is speculative to assume that
the Plaintiffs will be forced to buy insurance or pay a
penalty in 2014 because the Plaintiffs' circumstances
may change by then." The Government claims that a
Plaintiff may have employer provided health insurance
in 2014, a Plaintiff may qualify for an exemption in
2014, or there is the unfortunate possibility that a
Plaintiff will be dead in 2014. Additionally, in lead,
the Government points out that the named Plaintiff
will be eligible for Medicare Part A by 2014.29 The
Defendants claim it is impossible for the courts
to assume definitively that harm will come to the
Plaintiffs, leading to their belief that the Plaintiffs have
no standing.)

As stated in Whitmore, a plaintiff can have an injury
in factL even for a future injuiy. as long as the injuiy
is certain to happen. ' In the case of PPACA'k the
Act has been passed into lawx and the individual
mandate prov ision will go into effect in 2014.) The
Government has asserted that the individual mandate
is an essential feature of PPACA, 3 so it is unlikely
that the individual mandate wxould cease to exist at any
point betwxeen the present and 2014 without the entire
Act being invalidated by thie Courts. Therefore, the
Plaintiffs' argument that they possess an inj ury in fact,
even if the actual injury will not happen until 2014, is
persuasive.

T he Plaintiffs claim that they also have a present injury
because they currently have to begin to reorganize
their financial affairs3 4 and undertake major changes
to their financial planning to prepare for the future
costs associated with PPACA.3 In Mead, one Plaintifl
specified that she would have to save money to pay the
Act's penalties that she would otherwise set aside for
her children's college funds. 6 They contend that, even
though the provision does not go into effect until 2014.
there is an economic injury now, and an economic
injury has been found to be enough for standing.37 This
argument is persuasive. Plaintiffs argue that the current
need to begin saving money and the need to reorganize
business affairs to prepare for the requirement that
they purchase health insurance or pay a penalty in the
future is a legitimate current economic injury.
The Plaintiffs in these cases have standing to challenge
the Act. Of the standing requirements set forth in
Lujan,38 the only one really in question is whether the
Plaintiffs do, in fact, have an injury.39 The Plaintiffs
do have a clear future injury that is certain to occur
because in 2014 they will be required either to buy
health insurance or pay a penalty, reappropriating
financial resources not currently dedicated to such
a purpose. The Plaintiffs also have a present ijury
because of the immediate need to begin reorganizing
their finances in order to prepare for the future costs
associated with PPACA and the individual mandate.
Therefore, the Plaintiffs have injuries in fact and,
consequently, have standing to sue the Government.
2. Ripeness
A court can legally determine the outcome of a case
only if "the state of [the] dispute has reached, but has
not passed, the point when the facts have developed
sufficiently to permit an intelligent and useful decision
to be made."40 If a case is brought before the court
on "contingent future events that may not occur as
anticipated, or indeed may not occur at all," the case
may not be ripe for adjudication.41 If it is inevitable,
however, that the statute will afect the plaintifIs,
ev en if there is a lime gap betw~een the present and
the beginning of actual enforcemnent of the prov ision,
there is a clear controv ersy that allows litigation.4 To
determine ripeness, the Supreme Court has established
a two prong test.4 3 A court first must ev aluate whether
the issues in the case are rightly before the given court;
and second, must determine wxhether w ithholding
the judicial process from the parties until a later date
would cause them hardship.44
Defendants in the PPACA cases contend that the issues
at hand are not ripe because no harm can come to the
Plaintiffs until the pro-vision goes into effect in 2014.45

The Government additionally contends that, as to the
second prong of the Supreme Court"s ripeness test,
because the Plaintiffs are not currently being asked to
take any action, there is no hardship to the Plaintiffs
in being asked to wait to adjudicate at a later date.46
"The Supreme Court has long ... held that where the
enforcement of a statute is certain, a pre-enforcement
challenge will not be rejected on ripeness grounds."47
As stated above, the harm the Plaintiffs are alleging is
certain to occur from PPACA will in fact happen in
2014. Additionally, there is a real present harm to the
Plaintiffs in that they currently have to begin altering
their finances in preparation for spending more in
2014, either for health insurance or as a penalty or
for failing to comply with the individual mandate.
Because the Plaintiffs currently have a real harm, the
issues should be considered ripe.
TFheoretically. the Government should also want
this issue decided as soon as possible. IThe court
in Thomas fore Law Center points out that the
Government likely would want to know "whether an
essential part of its program regulating the national
health care market is constitutional." 48 If courts,
especially the Supreme Court, were to determine that
PPACA is unconstitutional, the Government should
want to know so it can act by making changes to
ensure that a constitutional form of PPAC A can be
enacted. Therefore, the issues in question are ripe
for adjudication. Both sides should want the issues
litigated as quickly as possible so they can begin
preparing in earnest for the changes to come if the
Act is constitutional, or so the Government can make
amendments to the Act or plan to abandon the laxx if
PPACA is deemed unconstitutional.
B. The Penalty for Non-Compliancewith the
Individual Mandate is Not a Tax and Therefore
is Not Controlled by the Anti-Injunction Act.
"The Congress shall have power to lay and collect taxes
... for the . .. general welfare of the United States

land tjo make all laxws xwhieh shall be necessarx
and proper for carrying into execution the foregoing
Poxxers." 49 The Anti-Injunction Act prexvents taxpayers
from bringing suit against the Internal Revenue Serxvice
(IRS) to question an action of the IRS that either has
or xwill result in the assessment or collection of a tax.50
The question heie is xwhethei the penalty for noncompliance wxith the indiv idual Inandate is or is not a
tax. In preyvious versions of the Act prior to enactmnent,
Congress referred to the fine for non compliance wxith
the individual mandate as a tax-5 In the final version,
hoxwever, Congress made a conscious decision to

change the xwording of the fine, by calling it a penalty.52
When Congress purposely deletes language from a
version of legislation, it is assumed that the Members
did not intend the previous language to become law.53
Additionally. the Act does contain numerous taxes
that are in fact referred to as taxes.54 When a piece of
legislation contains specific language in one portion,
but omits that language in another portion. courts
should not assume that Congress intended the omitted
language to become lax.55
Congress, by changing to a penalty what it had
previously called a tax, did not intend for the fine
imposed on any individual xxho does not comply
with the individual mandate and does not qualify
for an exemption to be considered a tax. Although
the penalty language is located within the Internal
Revenue Code:5 it is not otherwise treated like a tax
and was not intended to be a tax. Therefore, the AntiInjunction Act does not apply, as its scope reaches only
suits brought to question the assessment and collection
of an actual tax.57 Additionally, because the penalty
is not a tax, Congress cannot rely on the General
Welfare Clause to reaffirm the assertion that PPACA
is constitutional since the General Welfare Clause only
applies to taxes.58 The Government must rely on the
Commerce Clause to determine the constitutionality
of PPACA.59
C. Although the Type ofActivity Mandated
by PPACA and the Individual Mandate Has
Never Been Viewed by the Courts Before, it is
Econolic Activity that Is Validly Authorized
jnder the Comierce Clause of the United
States Constitution.
inder the Commerce Clause, 60 Congress may
regulate (1) "the use of channels of interstate or
foreign commerce which Congress deems are being
misused . . . [(2)] protection of the instrumentalities
of interstate commerce . . . [and (3)] those activities
affecting commerce." 61 In the recent cases challenging
the constitutionality ot PPAXCAY Plaintitfs assert that
the indiv idual mandate does not legally qualify for
iegulation by Congress under the Commeice Clause
because the indiv idual mandate is not regulating
actixvity; rathei; it is regulating inactixvity.62 The
Supreme Court has said, howxever, that ceven if
a questioned aetixvity 'may not be regarded as
commerce, it may still, xwhatever its nature, be reached
by Coneress if it exerts a substantial economic effect
on interstate commerce."6
The individual mandate seeks to penalize citizens
xxho elect not to purchase health insurance by 2014
but do not fall within one of the listed exemptions.64

Plaintiffs argue that the "pover to regulate activity
does not permit Congress to forbid inactivity."6" Ihex
also contend that "[tjhe act ... compels all Americans
to perform an affirmative act or incur a penalty, simply
on the basis that they exist and reside within any of the
United States."66 In response, Defendants argue that
requiring citizens to purchase health insurance or incur
a penalty is not penalizing inactivity, because choosing
not to purchase health insurance is a decision that
still has a substantial effect on the overall health care
market.67 The Defendants reason that, at some point
in all citizens' lives, they will need to avail themselves
of the health care market. 8 The Government argues
that the Act is not regulating inactivity, as the Plaintiffis
argue, but is rather "regulat[ing] economic decisions
on how to pay for those services - whether to pay in
advance through insurance or attempt to do so later out
of pocket - decisions that substantially affect the vast,
interstate health care market."
There is no true precedent for whether deciding not
to purchase mandated health insurance constitutes
economic activity under the Commerce Clause. The
closest cases for precedent are Wickard v ilburn,"
Heart a! Atlanta Motel, Inc. v nited States7 and
Gonzales v Raich.72 The courts that have already
looked at the constitutionality of PPACA, however. are
divided as to wx
hether they believe the precedents set
forth in Wickarl, Heart of Atlanta and Raich help the
Plaintiffs or the Defendants.73
In ickatrd, the Plaintiff argued that., although he was
growing more wheat than the allowable amounts, the
excess should not be subject to penalties since the
excess was purely for personal use.74 He argued that,
because he was not intending the excess to enter the
commercial market, Congress should not be able to
regulate it. 7 The Court ultimately determined that
although the Plaintiff did not intend for his excess
wheat to enter the commercial market, he was still
affecting such market.76 If he was using his own
excess wheat tor personal consumption, he was pulling
himself from the commercial maiket that he should
have been taking part in.n
In Heart a/Atlanta Motel," the Plaintiff, a motel oxxner,
questioned the constitutionality of the Civ il Rights Act
of 1964. TIhe Plaintiff did not xxish to be forced to
accept African American guests into his motel, and
believed that the Cixvil Rights Act had no business
foicing him to do so since his business wxas local and
not interstate."~ Thc Court, hoxwexver, determined that,
although his business xxas local, it xxas a motel. xwhich
by its very nature impacts interstate commerce." In
determining that the Plaintiff did not have a viable
Commerce Clause case. the Court pointed out that

"[t]he power of Congress over interstate commerce is
not confined to the regulation of commerce among the
states. It extends to those activities intrastate which so
affect interstate commerce or the exercise of the power
of Congress over it as to make regulation of them
appropriate means to the attainment of a legitimate
end. the exercise of the granted power of Congress to
regulate interstate commerce.""
In Raich, the Plaintiffs were California residents with
prescriptions for medical marijuana. 1TIhey brought
suit after federal agents, relying on the Controlled
Substances Act (CSA),84 seized marijuana plants
that one Plaintiff had been growing at home.8 The
Plaintiffs claimed that enforcing the CSA against
people with legitimate medical needs and prescriptions
for the drug violates the Commerce Clause.81 The
Court determined that. much like in ickard. "the
regulation is squarely xwithin Congress' commerce
power because production of the commodity meant
for home consumption, be it wheat or marijuana, has a
substantial effect on supply and demand in the national
market tor that commodity." Ihe Court deteimined
that restricting such activity was acceptable under
the Commerce Clause because it was clearly what
Congress intended with the entirety of the regulatory
scheme set forth in the CSA."
Courts examining PPACA also looked at United
States v Lopez" for guidance on whether the Act is
constitutional under the Commerce Clause. In Lopez,
a high school student was charged .with violating the
Gun Free School Zones Act of 199000 by carrying a
concealed weapon into a school zone." The Court
determined that the Gun Free School Zones Act was
unconstitutional because it exceeded Congress's power
under the Commerce Clause.) The Court reasoned
that possession of a gun in a school zone does not
in any significant way impact interstate commerce.
Therefore, the Gun Free School Zones Act of 1990
was unconstitutional under the Commerce Clause
since Congress lacked the authority to pass it 9
Courts that haxve already looked at thc constitutionality
of PPACA arc dixvidcd as to xwhether thc aboxve cases
support the Act's constitutionality or support the belief
that the Act is unconstitutional.94 IThe question xxill
ultinmately be xxhat the Supreme Court beliexes the
abov e cases have done to the breadth and scope ot the
permissibly regulated actixvities ruider the Commeice
Clause.
ITle Ihonmas Moare Lawx Center court argued that, xxith
the decisions in W1
icardt and Raich, "the Supreme Court
sustained Congress's power to impose obligations on
individuals who claimed not to participate in interstate
commerce, because those obligations were components

of broad schemes regulating interstate commerce."'" In both these cases,
the Plaintiffs were claiming that their actions were not activity impacting
interstate commerce because their actions were conscious decisions to keep
their activities out of the commercial market.96 In both cases, however, the
Court said that by choosing not to participate in a given market, the Plaintiffs
were still substantially impacting the market.> A commercial market
depends on people participating in it.If a large number of people who could
and should be taking part in the given market decide to act on their own.
their withdrawal from the market has a negative impact. Therefore, under
their power to regulate activity that has an effect on interstate commerce,
Congress has the ability to regulate the activity of people choosing not to
participate in the commercial market, which can also be thought of as the
individual's theoretical inactivity in the commercial market.
The court in Alead" similarly reasoned that Wickard was analogous
to PPACA. The court argued that Congress's authority to regulate both
insurance markets and the price of insurance policies "has been long
established.'" The court asserts that the decision to buy health insurance,
or to decline to do so, is a choice relating to the consumption of a
commodity that affects the economy.100 When individuals forego the option
to purchase health insurance and subsequently incur health care costs that
they cannot pay, the debt leads to higher insurance premiums for the rest
of the population. TIhe court describes the ellect as "strikingly similar to
that described in Wickard." T'Ihe Alead court also belittled the Plaintiffs'
argument that it is an inactive choice, labeling it "pure semantics."103
IThe Supreme Court, however, has not validated unlimited use of the
Commerce Clause. In Lope, the Supreme Court determined that Congress
was not permitted to "pile inference upon inference" to establish activity
that would have a substantial enough impact on interstate
commerce to fall within Congress's Commerce Clause authority.1 4 The
Supreme Court has also said that Congress cannot use speculation to assert
that violence can be regulated under the Commerce Clause.) IEssentially,
if the activities in the legislation are not actually commercial, Congress
is not permitted to stretch and speculate to find a rationale for regulating
the activits under the Commerce Clause. If there is an economic rationale
for the regulation, however, Congress can regulate the activits under the
Commerce Clause, even if the laws are actually regulating a person who is
trying not to participate in a market that he or she should be participating in.
To determine whether an activity can be regulated under the Commerce
Clause, the courts need to understand what impact the specific activity
has on the commercial market that it is intended to be a pait of.i6 in
the case ot PPAkCAs the legislation is intended to impact the health care
insurance maiket and the health care seivices maiket in general. Congress
has male it clear that the individiual mandate. xwhich the Plaintiffs claim is
unconstitutional, is an essential portion of the greater Act. i07
Whether an indiv idual has health insurance or not, at some point in their
liv es. they ssill hasve to partake in the health care market. whether it is at
a doctor's office, an urgent care center. oi a hospital emeigency ioom. ios
The health caie maiket is a large, interstate market that consists of sarious
prosviders of health care sersvices, xshich can be paid for by prisvate or public
insurance, or out of pocket. The goal of PPACA is to eliminate the out of
pocket paymeats for direct health care services.109 Individuals w5
ho choose
to pay out of pocket for any encounter they have with the health care market

are generally hoping that nothing major happens to them that would cause
a large expenditure that they cannot afford. UInfortunately, however, many
of them do not realize how expensive even a simple visit to an urgent care
clinic can be without insurance. Although many people who choose not to
purchase insurance save enough money tor times when they need to see a
doctor or get a prescription, they often do not have the money to finance
an emergency. since even just being seen and released in an emergency
room costs an incredible amount.no Those unpaid costs end up going
back on other taxpayers through increased costs to keep public hospitals
open, increased insurance preniums, lost costs for health care providers,
or increased costs for the local governments. " Unlike other econonic
markets, hospitals are legally prohibited from turning dossn individuals that
cannot pay. IPACA xwas passed by Congress in an attempt to help curb
these added costs that could be prevented if people just acted responsibly
and got health insurance. 11i

The Defendants argue that by choosing not to purchase health insurance,
the Plaintiffs and others who make the same decision, are in fact having
a substantial impact on the health care market.114 The increased costs to
the health care providers, the Government, and the taxpaying public are in
fact affecting the market that the Plaintiffs are claiming they have chosen
not to be a part of.I" The argument made by the Defendants that, whether
people choose to or not, all citizens, at some point, take advantage of some
aspect of the health care market is valid. The Plaintiffs want to choose
hoi' to take part in the market, but they are not actually choosing not to
take part in the market. The Government is within its rights to regulate
an interstate commerce market, such as the health care services market.
and require that citizens choose the method of entry into the market that
would cost taxpayers the least overall. That is exactly what Congress is
doing by requiring anyone who may take part in the market, namely all
citizens, either to purchase health insurance or pay a penalty for choosing
a method that will have a negative financial impact on the Governmnent and
all taxpayers. As the Thomas More Law Center court said "[tjhe plaintifis
have not opted out of the health care services market because, as living,.
breathing beings,. .. they cannot opt out of this market.""1
Even if the Plaintiffs, by choosing not to purchase health insurance, were
opting not to participate in the health care market, that still would not
preclude Congress's ability to regulate an individual's decisions. As the
Supreme Court has already determined, if Congress has the authority to
regulate an interstate commercial market, it also has the ability to regulate
those persons who choose not to participate in it.'
Because of that
authoity, esven if a court determined that the Plaintitfs wsere legitimately
choosing not to be a pait of the health care market, since the health care
market can be regulated and involsves interstate commerce, the indisvidual
mandate is ennstitutinol. because eithei: (1) the Plaitiffs' acetions aie part
ot the market and can be regulated; or (2) thes aie opting out of a market
and can still be regulated.
Accor ding to the GrovernmentL the indisvidual mandate is an essential
component to the osverall Act.i"i Because the Act also requires. beginning
in 2010 for children and 2014 for adults, that insuirance companies do not
discriminate against individuals wxith pre-existinlg conlditions,"' thereby
allowing these individuals to access reasonably priced health insurance.
the Government asserts that without the individual mandate, individuals

wishing not to purchase health insurance would then have an even greater
incentive not to purchase health insurance.120
Without the pre-existing conditions provision, it becomes prohibitively
expensive for an individual who initially chooses not to purchase health
insurance to then purchase insurance upon diagnosis of cancer or heart
disease, assuming that the individual even Ands a plan that will insure
his or her condition. Some plans will insure sick individuals, but will not
pay costs associated with their diseases under the premise that insurance
companies are not liable for individuals' pre-existing conditions. 'This
system creates an incentive for individuals to purchase insurance before
they get sick. Unless people are independently wealthy, they will not be able
to pay lor either the cost of health insurance after they get sick or the costs
of treatment for whatever disease they now have.
After the pre-existing conditions provision goes into effect, however,
the Governminent argues that, if people are not required by the individual
mandate to purchase insurance, they will have an incentive not to purchase
insurance until after they get sick."' IThis assertion by the Government
comes about because after the pre-existing condition provision goes into
effect, if a person becomes seriously ill,. there will be insurance exchanges
established that will still allow the individual to purchase moderately priced
health insurance. Additionally, under the new law. the insurance that the
sick individual purchases after he or she gets sick will be required to cover
the serious illness.1' If, in 2014, individuals were not required to have and
maintain health insurance coverage, there would be many individuals who
would elect not to purchase insurance knoing that if they got sick they
would still have access to fairly affordable insurance at that time. Although
Congress has established these exchanges to prevent the discrimination
against sick individuals that has gone on or Far too long, this coverage,
although reasonably affordable to the individualx,
will likely still be more
expensive than normal insurance would be.12 4 Sick individuals, who are
by their very nature more expensive to insure, will still be a Anancial drain
on the health care system if they are purchasing insurance only after they
get sick.
PP\CA has a dual purpose of ioNwering health care costs generally in
America and making sure that most uninsured Americans get health
insurance coverage.'
As of 2009, there were 50.7 million uninsured
Americans, up from 46.3 million just a year earlier, which is a serious and
costly problem for the United States.1' Without the individual mandate,
and given the pre-existing conditions provision, it would be likely that.

instead of PPACA creating less uninsured Americans, it would instead
cause morc Americans to opt not to purchase hcaith insurance until they
hasve a scrious illness. leading to a bigger uninsured probicm than currently
exists in the United States.
Because of this potential problem, Congress theorizcd that the individual
mandate 55as essential to the entiirety of the regulatory scheme created by
PPACA. The Suprcme Court has long niade it clear that if a prosvision of
a rcgulation is essential to the oxverall regulatory scheme, the legislation
xwouid beconie futile if the proxision wecre eliminated or not followxed.127
Therefore, Congrcss is wvithin its rights to regulate the health care market
exen if wxhat the Plaintifts argue is valid and C ongress is regulating the
Plaintiffs' decision not to take part in the market, since that decision will
still have a substantial impact on the overall regulatory scheme.

The Commerce Clausei allows Congress to regulate (1) "the use of
channels of interstate or foreign commerce which Congress deems are being
misused ... [(2)] protection of the instrumentalities of interstate comnierce
[and (3)] those activities affecting commerce."l Ihe Plaintiffs, who
believe that the individual nandate is an unconstitutional overextension of
the Commerce Clause, argue that Congress is asking the Government to
regulate inactivity instead of the required activity.Iso Even if the questioned
activity does not directly affect interstate commerce, as long as the activity
has an impact on the greater commercial market, Congress can regulate it
within the Commerce Clause."
T he Plaintiffs' assertion that Congress is regulating inactivity is invalid
since all United States citizens will at some time or another need to avail
themselves of the health care market. it is not a market that any American
citizen can opt out of.< This is a case of rst impression because PPACA
is requiring the expansion of the Commerce Clause to regulate in a way it
never has before. In previous cases, notably in Raich,1' 1eart of tlanta
Adotel, i and ficred, 3the
courts regulated markets that not all people
would ever take part in. Once an individual decided to take part in the
market, even if it was a decision to be involved in the activity but not in the
market, Congress was allowsed to regulate the individual's activity. On the
otherhand, PPACA is asking the courts for permission to regulate a market
that, as the Governminent correctly asserts, people do not have the option
to opt in or out of. Simply by being alive, at some point in their lives, all
citizens will have to take advantage of the health care market.'6
As the Florida court explained, the "case lass is instructive, but ultimately
inconclusive because the Commerce Clause... [has] never been applied in
such a manner before." iT7Ihe constitutionality of PEACA will ultimately
have to be decided by the Supreme Court, since there is no precedent
completely on point. When one or all of the cases ultimately gets to the
highest court, the Supreme Court should agree with Thomas More Law
Center and lead that, although this is an application of the Commerce
Clause that has never been looked at before, it is a legitimate and
constitutional expansion of the Commerce Clause. The individual mandate
and PPACA should ultimately be considered constitutional.
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